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STATE SPEECH AND POLITICAL
LIBERALISM
ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES,
AND VIRTUES. James E. Fleming 1 and Linda C.
McClain. 2 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
2013. Pp. 371. $49.95 (Cloth).
Abner S. Greeni
State regulation and state persuasion require different
grounds of legitimacy. If we understand political liberalism to
require, among other things, that the state "remain neutral
toward disputed and controversial ideals of the good life," 4 this
neutrality should focus on state regulation, not state persuasion.
Perhaps the state's attempt to regulate based on common
ground und~rsta~dings (an overlapping consensus of r~as~nable
comprehensive views of the good} can help secure this kind of
liberalism in politics. Even when it regulates in this fashion,
however, the state should attend to the costs imposed on those
who cannot share in the common ground understanding, or so I
6
have argued previously. This is so even though the failure of
neutrality is one of effect and not purpose. Establishment Clause
limits regarding state religious speech aside (at least in our
1. The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, Associate
Dean for Intellectual Life, and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
2. Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University
School of Law.
3. Leonard F. Manning Professor, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Caroline
Corbin and Mark Rosen for helpful comments.
4. CHARLES LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY x (1987).
5. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
6. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012); Abner S. Greene, The
Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY
(Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Abner S. Greene, Constitutional Reductionism, Rawls,
and the Religion Clauses, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2089 (2004); Abner S. Greene, Kiryas
Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1996); Abner S. Greene,
Uncommon Ground: A Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's
Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (1994); Abner S. Greene,
The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993).
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constitutional order), a proper understanding of political
liberalism need not, though, hem the state in regarding its speech
power, need not limit it to advancing co1mmon ground
understandings or liberal conceptions of the good. My prior
work has argued for a deep and wide pluralism in a liberal
constitutional order-just as the state should accommodate
those whose religious and other beliefs and practices cannot be
part of the regulatory common ground, so should we see the
"state" as many mini-states (federal, state, local), all competing
for citizens' allegiance, and able to advance through speech (and
conditional funding) a wide array of goals, shared and not-soshared, liberal and not-so-liberal. Citizens as listeners and voters
can then make up their own minds. I believe this deep and wide
pluralism is an aspect of the best understanding of political
liberalism- a presumptive accommodation of those whose
practices are harmed by common ground regulation; state
speech that rna; be on contested issues and may (with some
possible limits) advance views at odds with standard liberal
virtues. We should see political liberalism as applying liberalism's open-mindedness, uncertainty, and humility to state action
generally, acknowledging that viewpoints that reject these
virtues help provide a check on laws that are otherwise liberal
(in effect only, perhaps) and on state speech that would
otherwise advance only standard liberal ends. This marriage of
pluralism with political liberalism not only provides a checking
function against the state; it also permits groups to develop apart
from the state, an important aspect of diversity. Furthermore, it
is the best way to apply an appropriate liberal sense of doubt
about whether we've gotten the right or best answers.

***
Jim Fleming and Linda McClain have written an impressive
book on the responsible exercise of rights, which flows from
prior writing by each.K Their title, "Ordered Liberty," is a bit of a
misnomer, however. When one thinks of that phrase, one thinks
of the ways in which we balance liberty against order, i.e., against
security, police power, controlling the excesses of liberty.
Responsibility in the exercise of rights is an aspect of how rights
7. In addition to Establishment Clause limits on state speech, the Equal Protection
Clause might best be understood to prevent government from denigrating persons on the
basis of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, etc.
R See JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE
OF AUTONOMY (2006); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING
CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY (2006).
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are orderly, but the major hard cases involving rights are hard
because significant claims of harm are in play. Think of much of
constitutional criminal procedure, free speech cases that are
tough because speech causes serious harm, not because it does
not, and abortion rights jurisprudence. Fleming and McClain
have much to say about what it means to exercise rights
responsibly, but little to say about the state's claims of order in
the sense of preventing or redressing serious harm to others.
A core claim in the book is that encouraging the responsible
exercise of rights is consistent with a proper understanding of
liberalism. Liberalism is not, on this view, just about appreciating
the ways in which the state may be checked and the liberties of
individuals fleshed out. In addition, it is about the state's
(including the government, its officials, and persons acting as
citizens) helping to foster and shape how such liberties are
understood and employed. One focus of the book is the ways in
which the state (and civil society) may use its persuasive
powers-through speech, conditional funding, and the like-to
"help persons develop their moral capacities for self-government
and, in that sense, live good lives" (p. 4). Fleming and McClain
call this "constitutional liberalism," and deem it "a mild form of
perfectionism" (p. 4). Corey Brettschneider's recent book When
9
the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, also offers a defense of
government speech to enhance certain liberal virtues (although
he might not put it precisely this way). His conception of "value
democracy"' 0 obligates the state to use its persuasive (but not
coercive) powers to "transform ... inegalitarian beliefs ... that
11
challenge the ideal of free and equal citizenship."
Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider do not offer the same
government speech agenda-the former focus on autonomy and
the latter on equality- but both develop a distinctively liberal
conception of the state's role as persuader.
In this review, I will discuss two aspects of these arguments
for government speech. First, I will challenge the claim in both
books that theirs is a political rather than comprehensive
liberalism. To some extent, this involves coming to grips with
Rawls' distinction between these two concepts. But I primarily
mean to make a conceptual, rather than interpretive claim, i.e.,
9. COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT
SAY? HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY

(2012).
10.
11.

/d. at4.
/d. at 89.
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that the kinds of values, or virtues, that these books say the state
should foster are based on a distinctive notion of the person and
of the state's relationship with its citizens, and thus cannot be
considered simply predicates we must accept for any properly
working liberal order. Second, I will contend that the state's
speech power in a liberal democracy should be broader than
either book suggests. This is consistent with what I believe to be
a proper political (rather than comprehensive) liberalism.
Moreover, I mean this second argument, for the scope of
government speech, to stand whether or not one agrees with my
treatment of the political versus comprehensive liberalism issue.
For Fleming and McClain, responsibility in a liberal
democracy is better seen as "autonomy" than as '·'accountability
to community'' (p. 3). The state need not be hands off in
encouraging the responsible exercise of rights (that is a too
limited understanding of liberalism); but it should foster the
conditions for, and aid in the exercise of, knowledgeable choice
among permissible alternatives, rather than steer citizens in one
direction or another. For example, in the abortion setting,
Fleming and McClain argue for "encouraging citizens to be
aware of a range of perspectives" (p. 67), and for "balanced
counseling encouraging responsible self-determination" (p. 68).
This role for the state is consistent with a proper constitutional
liberalism, they argue, which is a version of (their understanding
of) political liberalism. They make this clear when they critique
Ronald Dworkin's move to (what they say is) comprehensive
liberalism (pp. 3-4). And they add: "Our formative project for
constitutional liberalism is analogous to Rawls's political
liberalism in maintaining that government should not embrace
any comprehensive moral doctrine. Nor should government
attempt to secure agreement upon an orthodoxy concerning the
best way of life" (p. 118).
Brettschneider argues for the state to engage in "'democratic
12
persuasion,"
promoting the "ideal of free and equal
13
citizenship." This is a political, or public, and not compre14
hensive ideal, he maintains. The state should speak, in various
ways (including through public education), to preach the core
values of equal citizenship, and should encourage persons in
their private capacities to adopt these liberal democratic virtues.
12.
13.
14.

!d. at 4.
!d. at 24.
!d. at 14.
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He even extends this latter argument to religious persons and
institutions: although the state should not use its coercive powers
to infringe the free exercise of religion, it may encourage
religions whose beliefs do not accord with our constitutional
notions of, say, gender equality, to alter their views.'-' His point
here is not to engage in theological debate or attack religion as
such, but to include (or fail to exclude) religion in the set of
beliefs that the state may seek to adjust via its persuasive
powers.
I am doubtful that Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider are
actually offering versions of political rather than comprehensive
liberalism. The distinction is a matter of both scope and grounds.
Political liberalism goes to core matters of citizenship only;
comprehensive liberalism goes more deeply, to touch what we
would normally consider private matters and issues relating to
the person apart from his or her role as citizen or official. These
are matters of scope, and, for the most part, Fleming/McClain
and Brettschneider limit their arguments to the civic/political
realm in a way that would justify their claim to be political
liberals. For example, Fleming and McClain state that "what
separates perfectionism from political liberalism is that
perfectionists appeal to furthering human goods, while political
liberals generally appeal to fostering the preconditions for free
and equal citizenship and the capacities for democratic and
personal self-government" (p. 116). Brettschneider says that his
is an argument about the political realm only, about the proper
qualities of democratic citizenship. Thus, he refers to his "more
limited concern with political equality, rather than with equality
6
in some more comprehensive sense''' ; he defines "the
democratic ideal of free and equal citizenship" "in political
terms, and distinguish[ es] it from more comprehensive notions
of equality"' 7 ; his argument about equality within family life
"derives from a 'thin' or non-comprehensive conception of free
and equal citizenship."'x The last quotation reveals something
true of both books- they discuss family life in a way that extends
the notion of the political rather deep. Both are aware of this
and seek to link political understandings of autonomy and
equality with how life in families potentially prepares one for life
as a citizen. Thus, in a discussion of civil society that includes
15.
16.

17.
lR

/d. at 143.
/d. at 14.
/d. at 24.

/d. at 54.
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families, Flen1ing and McClain talk about the "liberal
expectancy of congruence between civil society and
democracy- that the values cultivated in civil society will be
liberal democratic values and thus will undergird liberal
democracy .... [O]ur own account of the roles of civil society
holds this liberal expectancy" (p. 90). Brettschneider argues,
similarly, in a discussion that includes family life, that "while a
commitment to free and equal citizenship only entails endorsing
a 'thin' set of values, this endorsement potentially challenges the
comprehensive conceptions of citizens and some practices often
regarded as private."' Nonetheless, both books hoist the banner
of political liberalism through arguments that go to what we
share as citizens.
But although Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider arguably
limit the scope of their arguments in a way that is 1::onsistent with
a political rather than comprehensive liberalism, the values and
virtues that they defend as appropriate for the state (and all of
us) to be advocating are contestable and part of some, but not
other, views of the good life. So, Fleming and McClain focus on
responsibility "as autonomy" (p. 3). Both the state and civil
society have a "responsibility to help persons develop their
moral capacities for self-government and, in that sense, live good
lives" (p. 4). In her prior work, McClain argues sitnilarly that one
guideline for government persuasion should be: "is government's
purpose for such persuasive measures to foster the capacity for
20
self-government? Is this the likely effect of such measures?"
Regarding education, she continues, "Fostering children's
capacities for self-government should cultivate not only res~ect
for authority but also autonomy and critical reflection." In
discussing abortion, Fleming and McClain focus on helping
citizens become aware of a "range of perspectives," on
"balanced counseling" (pp. 67-68). Their constitutional
liberalism "recognizes a proper role for government in helping
to develop the moral powers (or capacities) of citizens, to
prepare them for self-governing citizenship" (p. 116). "[W]hat
separates perfectionism from political liberalism," they argue, "is
that perfectionists appeal to furthering human goods, while
political liberals generally appeal to fostering the preconditions
for free and equal citizenship and the capacities for democratic
19. /d. at 53.
20. MCCLAIN, supra note 8, at 46. See id. at 126-27 (government persuasion
regarding marriage should include autonomy, developing capacity for choice, equality).
21. /d. at 69.
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and personal self-government" (p. 116). The "political (or
public)" values that the state should promote include "the equal
citizenship of women" (p. 116). Under Fleming and McClain's
"mild civic liberal perfectionism," "government should
undertake a formative project of securing the capacities for
democratic and personal self-government, including cultivating
the civic virtues necessary for responsible citizenship" (pp. 17879).
Brettschneider focuses on the state's advancing the ideal of
free and equal citizenship, as speaker, spender, and educator. 22
He accepts that this is not viewpoint neutral, but consistent with
Supreme Court doctrine allowing deviation from viewpoint
23
neutrality if the state is not regulating. The state should teach
24
civil rights history in a non-neutral way. "[P]arental rights do
not include the ability to raise children free from exposure to the
25
ideas fundamental to liberal democracy." Accordingly, he
26
critiques Wisconsin v. Yoder, which interpreted the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to require an
exemption for the Amish from sending their teenage children to
27
any type of school, public or private. The state should
encourage students to reflect and debate, and Brettschneider
acknowledges this too is not value neutral. 2H When it comes to
state subsidy, he admits that "[v]alue democracy embraces non2
neutral criteria in deciding which groups to fund. " He applies
all of his arguments to state speech that might affect religious
belief and practice antithetical to his conception of free and
equal ci~iz.enship, acceptin~ that his view is .incorvpatible with
some rehg1ons on the question of exposure to Ideas:
The conceptions of autonomy, freedom, equality, and openmindedness are ones we should share, adopt, and try to persuade
others to adopt. Were I a government official, I would try to
promote them (with some caveats that I will mention below). I
hope I try to live by them and advocate them to my friends.
But . . . what kinds of ideas are these? Are they somehow
implicit in a proper understanding of liberal democracy? If they
l)

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 46.

/d.
/d. at 95.
!d. at 97.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 98-99.

/d. at 101.
/d. at 111.
/d. at 164.
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are, does that remove then1 from the realm of cornprehensive
notions of the good? I contend that these are contested, not
natural, understandings of citizenship; they are part of a specific
iteration of statehood and statecraft; they are (to some extent, in
some ways) inconsistent with some fundamentalist religious
views, and some secular positions on, say, how children should
be raised and the relationship between men and women. We
should see these arguments as grounded in a kind of
comprehensive liberalism; there is no neutral or higher ground
of argument that can render them arguments from "political"
liberalism.
Another way of putting this is that Fleming/McClain and
Brettschneider are making a kind of "fit" argument, i.e., that the
values and virtues they are touting (and suggesting the state
tout) are endogenous and uncontestable terrain of our political
conception of justice. For example, Brettschneider writes that
"[c]omprehensive doctrines are those that seek to go beyond a
theory of what is owed to people by virtue of their common
31
status as political beings subject to state power." If we want to
claim that a liberal democracy necessarily contains certain values
such as equality (as we have come to understand it; both books
discuss both gender and sexual orientation) and autonomy
(including getting full knowledge, open-mindedness, having a
wide range of choices, etc.), we should do so in one of two ways.
We should acknowledge that we are a comprehensive liberal
republic, and then think seriously about what that means for
citizens who adopt different values, i.e., who challenge what we
see as in1plicit. Or-and better, more accurate, I would suggestwe should see these values of equality and autonomy as just
some among many that the state may support, i.e., not as
endogenous and uncontestable terrain of our political
conception of justice. Here I share Flemingll\1cClain's and
Brettschneider's distinction between state regulatory power and
state speech/funding power. Regarding the former, I share their
views about the limits on state regulation in the name of a
proper constitutional conception of equality and autonomy (the
latter cashing out in various areas, speech, religion, reproductive
rights, adult sexual choices, etc.) As I have argued elsewhere,32
the state in a liberal democracy may regulate in these (and
other) ways, but must be attentive to the cost to those who adopt

31.
32.

/d. at 14.
See supra note 6.
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different normative views, by providing appropriate exemptions
and accommodations. Regarding state speech/funding power,
although my personal preferences are to foster the values and
virtues that Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider feature (and
although I would seek to advance such values via speech/funding
were I in office), a proper political liberalism should be more
open to the state's advancing a wide range of visions of the good,
not just ones that fit with a comprehensive liberal understanding
of citizenship. I will say more about this below.
I have been suggesting that as a conceptual matter, we
should understand comprehensive liberalism according to the
grounds stated for state (and citizen) action, not merely
according to the scope of application of such grounds. As a
matter of interp~et.ing .Ra"Yls, this is not an ea~~ issue. To SOJ?e
extent, Rawls' distinction IS a matter of scope.-- Comprehensive
moral conceptions apply to "what is of value in human life, and
ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of
4
familial and associational relationships .... "' Political moral
conceptions are "worked out for a specific kind of subject,
35
namely, for political, social, and economic institutions." The
content of a political conception of justice is "expressed in terms
of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public
3
political culture of a democratic society." h
On the other hand, the problem Rawls was responding to in
Political Liberalism was that he came to see some of the
concepts from A Theory of Justice as grounded in
comprehensive liberalism, and accordingly okay for ideal theory
but problematic in terms of actual governance (and legitimacy)
in a liberal democracy. 37 As Samuel Freeman puts it, "The
problem Rawls ... discovered with official political appeals to
autonomy [is] familiar. The value of autonomy is part of one or
more 'comprehensive doctrines' which ... could not be generally
endorsed by conscientious moral agents, even in a well-ordered
society where Rawls's own principles of justice are generally
accepted." 3H And Rawls was careful to limit the appropriate
state-endorsed content of children's education. Let me quote

As he says. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 13.
!d.
35. !d. at 11.
36. !d. at 13.
37. See id. at Introduction.
38. Samuel Freeman, Public Reason and Political Justifications. 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2021,2025 (2004).
33.

34.
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him at length:
"[V]arious religious sects oppose the culture of the modern
world and wish to lead their common life apart from its
unwanted influences. A problem now arises about their
children's education and the requirements the state can
impose. The liberalisms of Kant and Mill may lead to
requirements designed to foster the values of autonomy and
individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life. But
political liberalism has a different aim and requires far less. It
will ask that children's education include such things as
knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, for
example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their
society and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to insure
that their continued membership when they come of age is
not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear of
punishment for offenses that do not exist. Moreover, their
education should also prepare them to be fully cooperating
members of society and enable them to be self-supporting; it
should also encourage the political virtues so that they want
to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations
39
with the rest of society. "

Although Rawls to some extent focuses on scope in this
passage, the main point is to clarify that the state in a liberal
democracy should foster what I would call a fairly thin set of
virtues, and back off from fostering autonomy and individuality
in a way that would more deeply cut against the norms of various
subgroups. Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider advance a view
of the state's persuasive power that is more grounded in and
intent on fostering distinctively liberal virtues. 1\fy view about
the appropriate scope for government speech, about which I will
say more in a moment, borrows some from Rawls' treatment and
differs from Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider- I, too,
believe the state should be cautious about promoting (only)
distinctively liberal virtues such as autonomy, open-n1indedness,
equality, and the like. My view then goes on to claim a thicker
role for government speech, to permit various not-so-liberal
viewpoints (as well as liberal ones) to be fostered, and to
encourage the state to provide a seedbed for a wide array of
viewpoints, some of which may challenge liberal norn1s.
In earlier writing, I have argued for a robust role for
40
government speech. The argument differs from Fleming/
39.
40.

RAWLS, supra note 5, at 199.
See Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 1253
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McClain's and Brettschneider's, and differs even if one takes
their side over mine regarding whether their ideas are truly
politically liberal. I contend that the state may speak on
contested issues, even those that do not involve autonomy or
equality and even to advance positions that a traditionally liberal
view might abjure. So, for example, I maintain that public high
schools may choose to teach abstinence-only education, sex
education, both, or neither. Regardless of my preference were I
running such a school, I do not believe the state is limited to
introducing a broad range of perspectives or the perspective that
might best accord with my preferred version of gender equality.
(Or my preferred way to ensure against religious norms being
filtered through the state. On this point: I have argued it is
unconstitutional for the state to ground coercive law through
41
predominant, expressly religious argument. The same would go
for state speech. But laws or persuasive activity that can be
translated into secular terms are fine, even if the law or speech
act accords best or most with the views of a particular religion or
religions.) In earlier work, McClain says that providing sex
education is part of "government's affirmative responsibility to
promote responsible self-government and to facilitate the work
of families in doing so. " 42 She adds that it is "not defensible for
government to seek to advance a conservative sexual economy
43
through funding abstinence-only education." We should see
these as comprehensive liberal views on the state's role in
education, and should prefer a view of state speech that is a
bigger tent, that permits localities to choose for themselves
which values involving teenage sexuality to promote via public
education.
Here is another example of how I believe a state may speak
on contested issues: it may say it favors childbirth over abortion
or that it favors a woman's right to choose between the two. Or
that it favors neither and expressly wants to remain on the
sidelines. Although I support the ri~ht of a woman to choose
4
whether to carry her child to term, and have serious doubts
(2011); Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1667 (2001 ); Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1
(2000).
41. See GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 6, at 150-55; Greene, The
Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, supra note 6, at 1614-33.
42. MCCLAIN, supra note 8, at 257.
43. /d. at 276.
44. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
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about the outcome of the abortion-counseling gag rule case, Rust
v. Sullivan, 45 in general abortion should be an area in which the
state may take sides, if it wants, via its persuasive powers. My
doubts about Rust go to the setting in which the speech is taking
place (doctor's offices). My argument for state speech requires
46
that it be neither monopolistic nor coercive, and telling poor
women who come to Title X clinics that they n1ay carry their
fetuses to term, while telling them nothing a bout abortion
alternatives even if they ask, risks rendering their ultimate
choices not fully knowing, and thus even if not strictly speaking
coerced, still constitutionally problematic. Brettschneider
disagrees on my main point here, contending that "[t]he decision
of individuals regarding abortion is in the realm of
comprehensive conceptions of the good, and thus falls beyond
47
the scope of democratic persuasion." But the state's advancing
its position in a contested arena, where some (not all) citizens
will ground their views in comprehensive conceptions of the
good, does not infringe liberty, because it is not regulatory. Were
the state required to advance just one view (say, the one that
best promotes women's equality) it would be, on my argument,
itself forced to advance a comprehensive liberalism. Better to
see the state as a participant in an active speech market, where
citizens can then make up their own minds. This notion of
listener autonomy is a key predicate to our free speech
jurisprudence generally, and helps undergird a n1ore capacious
understanding of state speech. 4K
Brettschneider's argument for the state's being hands-off·
regarding persuasion in the abortion setting sten1s from his
broader claim: "I do not suggest that the government should
mold opinion on matters about which there is reasonable
disagreement.""!'! In her prior work, McClain argued similarly: it
is "inappropriate for government to promote an orthodox~
concerning what views citizens should hold about a good life." 0
Let's put aside that there is disagreement about some of the
virtues that Brettschneider (and Fleming/McClain) would ask
the state to promote (this would require a discussion of the
"reasonable" and would lead us back to my clailn that their view
45.
46.
47.
4X.

500 U.S. 173 (1991).
See Greene. Government of the Good, supra note 40, at 26-49.
BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 123.
See Greene. Government of the Good, supra note 40, at 25-26. See also
BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at n6, XR.
49. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 39.
50. McCLAIN, supra note R, at 48.
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of what is implicit in liberal democracy may well be contested ).
The state may play a broader role. So long as it reveals itself as
52
speaker (to avoid ventriloquism ) and is neither coercive nor a
monopolist in the relevant speech market, the state may advance
what a majority believes to be true or good, leaving it to citizens
to decide in contested arenas. For an example of how we differ
here: Brettschneider says that because disagreement about
affirmative action is reasonable and an understanding of free
and equal citizenship doesn't require one answer, the issue is
53
thus "not subject to democratic persuasion. " I say that state
actors and jurisdictions may differ in their views about
affirmative action, and may seek to persuade citizens of one
position over the other. The sum total of diverse views here, and
elsewhere, supports a true political liberalism, open-minded at a
meta-level toward what may be good.

51.
52.
53.

See GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 6. at 56-63, 101-07.
See Greene, Government of the Good, supra note 40. at 49-52.
BRETTSCHNEIDER. supra note 9, at 90.

